Abstract-We consider two types of grouping among users in utility systems. The first type of grouping is from Chen et al. (2014), where each user belongs to a group of users having social ties with it. For this type of utility system, each user's strategy maximizes its social group utility function, giving rise to the notion of social-aware Nash equilibrium. We prove that, for a valid utility system, if the social utility function is submodular, then any social-aware Nash equilibrium achieves at least 1/2 of the optimal social utility, subject to a functiondependent additive term. We further prove that if the social utility function is nondecreasing and submodular, then any social-aware Nash equilibrium achieves at least 1/(1 + c) of the optimal social utility, where c is the curvature of the social utility function. For the second type of grouping we consider, the set of users is partitioned into l disjoint groups, where the users within a group cooperate to maximize their group utility function, giving rise to the notion of group Nash equilibrium. We prove that, for a valid utility system, if the social utility function is submodular, then any group Nash equilibrium achieves at least 1/2 of the optimal social utility, subject to a function-dependent additive term. By defining the curvature c k i associated with group i with ki users, we show that if the social utility function is nondecreasing and submodular, then any group Nash equilibrium achieves at least 1/(1 + max 1≤i≤l c k i ) of the optimal social utility. Finally, we present an example of a utility system for database assisted spectrum access to illustrate our results.
I. INTRODUCTION
A variety of interesting practical problems can be posed as utility maximization problems: these include facility location (e.g., [1] ), traffic routing and congestion management (e.g., [2] and [3] ), sensor selection (e.g., [4] and [5] ), and network resource allocation (e.g., [6] - [9] ). In a utility maximization problem, a set of users make decisions according to their own set of feasible strategies, resulting in an overall social utility value, such as profit, coverage, achieved data rate, and quality of service. The goal is to maximize the social utility function. Often, the users do not cooperate in selecting their strategies.
In general, it is impractical to find the globally optimal sequence (finite, ordered collection) of strategies maximizing the social utility function. Typically, it is more useful to consider scenarios where individual users or groups of users separately maximize their own private objective functions, and then ask how this compares with the globally optimal case. The usual framework for studying such scenarios is game theory together with its celebrated notion of Nash equilibria. A Nash equilibrium is a sequence of strategies (deterministic or randomized) for which no user can improve its own private utility by changing its strategy unilaterally. Nash [10] proves that any finite and noncooperative game has at least one Nash equilibrium.
The question of how the Nash solution compares with the globally optimal solution has received some attention in the literature. Notable results have been reported by [11] and [12] in the context of traffic routing and congestion management, which aims to minimize the total latency. For a general utility maximization problem, Vetta [13] develops lower bounds on the worst-case social utility value in noncooperative games. Specifically, he proves that for a submodular social utility function in a valid utility system, any Nash equilibrium achieves at least 1/2 of the optimal social utility value, subject to a function-dependent additive term. He also shows that for a nondecreasing and submodular social utility function in a valid utility system, any Nash equilibrium can achieve at least 1/(1 + c) of the optimal social utility function value, where 0 ≤ c ≤ 1 is the curvature of the social utility function.
In this paper, we are interested in exploring bounds when there is some notion of "grouping" among users. Along these lines, we consider two notions of grouping that yield to provable performance bounds. The first type of grouping we consider is the recent framework of Chen et al. [8] , where associated with each user is a private objective function and a fixed group of users having some social ties with it. Each user's strategy maximizes an objective function called the social group utility, which is the sum of its private objective function and a linear combination of the private objective functions of users in its group. Within this setting, Chen et al. [8] define what they call a social-aware Nash equilibrium, where no user can improve its social group utility by unilaterally changing its strategy. We will show that this framework yields to the bounding results of Vetta [13] for noncoperative games, thus establishing provable performance guarantees for the framework of [8] .
In the second type of grouping we consider, the set of users is partitioned into disjoint groups. Associated with each group is a group utility function. Users within a group cooperate in the sense that their strategy is to (jointly) maximize the group utility function, giving rise to a natural definition of group Nash equilibrium. This case does not yield to the results of [13] . Nonetheless, we show that for this case a similar bound holds. Moreover, we define a measure of curvature and derive an associated lower bound involving this curvature. This bound is tighter than that for the case where there is no grouping among users, accounting for the cooperation within the groups.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce our notation and some definitions that will be used throughout the paper. In Section III, we review the bounding results of [13] . we first describe the framework of [8] and show that, given submodularity and validity, any social-aware Nash equilibrium achieves at least 1/2 of the optimal social utility, subject to a functiondependent additive term. We further prove that if the social utility function is nondecreasing and submodular, then any social-aware Nash equilibrium achieves at least 1/(1 + c) of the optimal social utility, where c is the curvature of the social utility function. Next, we describe our second type of grouping involving l disjoint groups with in-group cooperation. We show that, given submodularity and validity, any group Nash equilibrium achieves at least 1/2 of the optimal social utility, subject to a function-dependent additive term. We then define the curvature c ki associated with group i with k i users, and we show that if the social utility function is nondecreasing and submodular, then any group Nash equilibrium achieves at least 1/(1 + max 1≤i≤l c ki ) of the optimal social utility. In Section IV, we present an example of a utility system for database assisted spectrum access, adopted from [8] . We show that the utility system for this example is valid and the social utility function is submodular, illustrating an application of our results.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first introduce notation and a number of definitions used throughout the paper.
A. Actions
Suppose we have a set N = {1, 2, . . . , N } of N users and ground sets V 1 , V 2 , . . . , V N , where each element in V i denotes an act that user i can take. We call a set of acts an action, and if an action x i ⊆ V i is available to user i we call it a feasible action. We denote by X i the set of all feasible actions for user i, i.e.,
, where x j ∈ X j , with i 1 ≤ j ≤ i k . We call X an action sequence of length k in X . This sequence includes the actions taken by users i 1 , . . . , i k in order. Given an action sequence X, suppose Y is formed by removing some of the elements of X without changing the order of the remaining elements. Then, we call the derived action sequence Y a subsequence of X and denote this relation by Y ⊆ X. This follows the definition of a subsequence in [14] .
Consider an action sequence X = (x 1 , . . . , x N ) ∈ X . Then, X −i = (x 1 , . . . , x i−1 , x i+1 , . . . , x N ) is the subsequence of X that includes actions taken by all users except user i. We use (X −i , x ′ i ) to denote the action sequence
as the concatenation of Y and Z when i p = j q for 1 ≤ p ≤ k and 1 ≤ q ≤ l (following the notation in [15] ).
B. Strategies
Let s i = (s = 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ n i and l = j, we say that user i takes a pure strategy. Otherwise, we say that user i takes a mixed strategy.
be the strategy space for user i and S = N i=1 S i . Similar to the definition of an action sequence, we call S = (s i1 , . . . , s i k ), with s j ∈ S j and i 1 ≤ j ≤ i k , a strategy sequence of length k in S. Then a subsequence T of S is a sequence derived from S by deleting some elements without changing the order of the remaining elements. We define S i = (s 1 , . . . , s i ), for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , as a sequence of strategies taken by users 1, . . . , i.
Given a strategy sequence S = (s 1 , . . . , s N ) ∈ S, the sequence S −i = (s 1 , . . . , s i−1 , s i+1 , . . . , s N ) is the subsequence of S that contains strategies taken by all users except user i, and (S −i , s
is the strategy sequence that results from S when user i changes its strategy from s i to s ′ i . Given strategy sequences T = (t i1 , . . . , t i k ) and W = (w j1 , . . . , w j l ), we write T ⊕ W = (t i1 , . . . , t i k , w j1 , . . . , w j l ) for the concatenation of T and W when i p = j q for 1 ≤ p ≤ k and 1 ≤ q ≤ l.
C. Utility Functions
We define the social utility function as a mapping γ from sequences in X to real numbers, and the private utility function for user i (1 ≤ i ≤ N ) as a mapping α i from sequences in X to real numbers. Correspondingly, we definē γ andᾱ i as mappings, from sequences in S to real numbers, that correspond to the expectations of γ and α i , respectively. We callγ the expected social utility function andᾱ i the expected private utility function for user i. We also define
We denote by Ω the optimal sequence of strategies in maximizing an expected utility functionγ, and assume that Ω = (σ 1 , . . . , σ N ) is composed of pure strategies σ i ∈ S i , i = 1, . . . , N . For convenience, we also use σ i to denote the optimal action that user i takes. Then, we have that the optimal value ofγ, denoted by OPT, is OPT=γ(Ω) = γ(Ω).
D. Curvature, Monotoneity, and Submodularity
Given a strategy sequence S i = (s 1 , . . . , s i ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , we use the notation Ω ∪ S i to represent the sequence in which user j (1 ≤ j ≤ i) implements the actions σ j ∪ x 1 j , . . . , σ j ∪ x nj j with probabilities s 1 j , . . . , s nj j , and user j (j > i) plays the action σ j , soγ(Ω ∪ S i ) is well defined. Then the curvature c of the expected social utility function γ is defined as c = max
The social utility function γ is called nondecreasing if for all subsequences Y of a sequence
Our terminology here is consistent with that of [14] . Becauseγ is the expected value of γ, we have that if γ is nondecreasing and submodular, thenγ is also nondecreasing and submodular, respectively. So in the following sections, when we say that γ is nondecreasing and submodular, it implies thatγ is nondecreasing and submodular, respectively.
III. PERFORMANCE BOUNDS FOR NASH EQUILIBRIA
In this section, we first review the definitions of a Nash equilibrium and a valid utility system from [13] . We then review the bounds derived in [13] for the performance of any Nash equilibrium.
Definition 1: A strategy sequence S ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium if no user has an incentive to unilaterally change its strategy, i.e., for any user i,
Assumption 1: [13] The private utility of user i (1 ≤ i ≤ N ) is at least as large as the loss in the social utility resulting from user i dropping out of the game. That is, the system (γ, {ᾱ i } N i=1 ) has the property that for any strategy sequence S = (s 1 , . . . , s N ) ∈ S,
Assumption 2: [13] The sum of the private utilities of the system is not larger than the social utility, i.e., for any strategy sequence S = (s 1 , . . . , s N ) ∈ S,
A utility system (γ,
) satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2 is called a valid system. Given X ∈ X , if for any (2) and (3) hold.
Theorem 1: [13] For a valid utility system (γ,
), if the social utility function γ is submodular, then for any Nash equilibrium S ∈ S we havē
If γ is non-decreasing, thenγ si (S −i ∪ Ω) ≥ 0 and the above inequality shows that any Nash equilibrium achieves at least 1/2 of the optimal social utility function value.
), if the social utility function γ is nondecreasing and submodular, then for any Nash equilibrium S ∈ S we havē
When the social utility function γ is nondecreasing and submodular, we have c ∈ [0, 1], which implies thatγ(S) ≥ γ(Ω)/2.
IV. NASH EQUILIBRIA BASED ON USER GROUPS

A. Social-Aware Nash Equilibria
In this section, we first introduce the social group utility maximization system and the social-aware Nash equilibrium defined in [8] . Then, we show that the results of [13] are directly applicable to bounding the performance of any social-aware Nash equilibrium.
In [8] , each user belongs to a group and aims to maximize its social group utility instead of its private utility. Each group is formed based on social ties between users and may reflect friendship, kinship, college relationship, etc. The social group utility for user i (a mapping from X to real numbers) is defined as
where α i 's are private utilities, N s i is the set of all users having a social tie with user i, and w im 's are weight parameters that reflect the strengths of social ties between user i and the users in N s i . Correspondingly, the expected group utilityη i for user i, mapping from sequences in S to real numbers, is the expected value of η i .
Definition 2: [8] A strategy sequence S = (s 1 , . . . , s N ) ∈ S is a social-aware Nash equilibrium if no user can improve its group utility by unilaterally changing its strategy, i.e., for any group i,η
By comparing the definition of a Nash equilibrium and a social-aware Nash equilibrium, we see that the only difference between them is that one is defined based on expected private utility functions and the other based on expected group utility functions. But because in [8] , each user has its own group utility function, and therefore its own expected group utility function, then the results of [13] (in particular Theorem 1 and Theorem 2) directly apply to bound the performance of the social-aware Nash equilibrium of [8] . We prove in Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 that this is in fact the case, if the social group utility system (γ,
) is valid if it satisfies the following assumptions, which are counterparts of Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 with expected group utilities standing in for expected private utilities.
Assumption 3: The group utility of user i (1 ≤ i ≤ N ) is at least as large as the loss in the social utility resulting from user i dropping out of the game. That is, the system
) has the property that for any strategy sequence S = (s 1 , . . . , s N ) ∈ S,
Assumption 4: The sum of the group utilities of the system is not larger than the social utility, i.e., for any strategy sequence S = (s 1 , . . . , s N ) ∈ S,
Given X ∈ X , if for any 1 ≤ i ≤ N , the inequalities η i (X) ≥ γ xi (X −i ) and N i=1 η i (X) ≤ γ(X) hold, then the inequalities (7) and (8) hold.
Theorem 3: For a valid utility system (γ,
), if the social utility function γ is submodular, then for any socialaware Nash equilibrium S ∈ S we havē
Theorem 4: For a valid utility system (γ,
B. Group Nash Equilibria
In this section we consider a different type of social group utility maximization system in which the set of all users are divided into disjoint groups, and the users in the same group choose their strategies by maximizing their group utility function jointly.
Assume that the set of users N = {1, . . . , N } is divided into l disjoint groups, in which group i (1 ≤ i ≤ l) has users {m i + 1, . . . , m i + k i }, where m i = i−1 j=1 k j , k j is the number of users in group j, and l j=1 k j = N . Let s i = (s mi+1 , . . . , s mi+ki ), where s i ∈ S i is the strategy for user i. We call s i the group strategy for group i. It includes the strategies taken by all the users in group i (1 ≤ i ≤ l). We use S −i to denote the sequence of group strategies taken by all groups except for group i. Given S −i , we denote by (S −i , t i ) the group strategy sequence obtained when group i changes its group strategy from s i to t i . Similarly, for X ∈ X , we use x i and X −i to denote the sequence of actions taken by the users in group i, and the sequence of actions taken by all groups except for group i, respectively. For convenience, we still use η i andη i to denote the group utility function and the expected group utility function for group i.
We define a group Nash equilibrium as follows. Definition 3: A strategy set S = (s 1 , . . . , s N ) is a group Nash equilibrium of a utility system if no group can improve its group utility by unilaterally changing its group strategy, i.e., for any 1 ≤ i ≤ l,
where t j ∈ S j for m i + 1 ≤ j ≤ m i + k i . We say that the utility system (γ,
) is valid if it satisfies the following two assumptions.
Assumption 5: The group utility of group i is at least as large as the loss in the social utility resulting from all the users in group i dropping out of the game. That is, the system (γ, {η i } N i=1 ) has the property that for any strategy sequence S = (s 1 , . . . , s N ) ∈ S,
Assumption 6: The sum of the group utilities of the system is not larger than the social utility, i.e., for any strategy sequence S = (s 1 , . . . , s N ) ∈ S,
Given X ∈ X , if for any 1 ≤ i ≤ l, the inequalities
hold, then the inequalities (11) and (12) hold. We now present our results on the performance of a group Nash equilibrium relative to the optimal social strategy Ω.
Lemma 1: Assume that the social utility function γ is a submodular set function. Then for any strategy set S ∈ S,
where
is the sequence of the group strategies taken by the first i groups.
By Propositions 1 and 2 in [16] , we have that
Combining the two inequalities above, we have (13). Theorem 5: For a valid utility system (γ,
), if the social utility function γ is submodular, then any group Nash equilibrium S = (s 1 , . . . , s N ) ∈ S satisfies
Proof: By Lemma 1, we havē
By the definition of a group Nash equilibrium, we have
By Assumptions 5 and 6, we have i:s i ⊆S\Ωγ
Combining the inequalities above and using submodularity results in
which implies that the inequality (14) holds. Remark
• If the utility function γ is nondecreasing, then the term
(Ω), which means that the social value of any group Nash equilibrium is at least half of the optimal social utility value. To better characterize the relation of the social utility value of any group Nash equilibrium and that of the optimal solution Ω, we define the curvature c ki of the social utility function for group i as
Lemma 2:
Assume that γ is a submodular set function. Then for any strategy set S = (s 1 , . . . , s N ) ∈ S, we havē
where s i = (s m+1 , . . . , s m+ki ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ l. Proof: By the submodularity ofγ, we havē
Theorem 6: For a valid utility system (γ,
), if the social utility function γ is nondecreasing and submodular, then any group Nash equilibrium S = (s 1 , . . . , s N ) ∈ S satisfiesγ (S)
where k * = min 1≤i≤l k i .
Proof: For any group Nash equilibrium S ∈ S, write
By the definition of the curvature c ki for group i, we havē
Using the inequality above and Lemma 2, we havē
which implies that
Following the arguments in [16] , we have that
where k * = min 1≤i≤l k i . Remarks
• When the group utility function γ is non-decreasing and submodular, it is easy to check that c ki ∈ [0, 1], which implies that 1/(1 + max 1≤i≤l c ki (γ)) ≥ 1/2.
• Following the arguments in [16] , we have that c k ≤ c k1 if k ≥ k 1 , and therefore 1/(1 + c k * ) ≥ 1/(1 + c 1 ). This shows that the bound for the case with grouping is tighter than that for the case without grouping. Of course, this is unsurprising, because grouping entails cooperation. Moreover, the larger the value of k * , the higher the degree of cooperation, and the tighter the lower bound.
V. EXAMPLE
In this section, we consider the application of utility-based maximization in database assisted spectrum access, adopted from [8] . We will show that the utility system is valid and the social utility function is submodular. We then apply the performance bounds for Nash, social-aware Nash, and group Nash equilibria.
Consider a set of users N = {1, . . . , N } and a set of TV channels M = {1, . . . , M }. The users in N wish to access the TV channels in M, for purposes other than TV transmissions, in a way that does not unnecessarily disrupt the primary use of these channels, which is for TV transmission. Specifically, to protect the primary TV users, each user i sends a spectrum access request message containing its geolocation information to a geo-location database. In response, the database sends back the set of vacant channels M i ∈ M and the allowable transmission power level P i . Then each user i chooses a feasible channel a i from the vacant channel set M i for data transmission. When multiple users choose to access the same vacant channel, they might interfere with each other, depending on their relative distance: If the distance between users m and i is d mi , interference occurs only if d mi ≤ δ, where δ is a given threshold. The aim is to minimize the total interference which is the sum of interference received by each user.
For a collection of selected channels A = (a 1 , . . . , a N ) ∈ N i=1 M, the interference experienced by user i is defined as
where N p i is the set of users that can interfere with user i, λ is a path-loss factor, I {·} is the indicator function, and ω i ai is the noise including the interchannel interference in channel a i resulting from primary TV users using other channels The private utility function α i of user i is then defined as
This private utility reflects the fact that each user desires to minimize its experienced interference. The social group utility of each user i is defined as
Finally, the social utility function is γ(A) = N i=1 α i (A).
A. Nash Equilibria
First we will prove that the utility system (γ, {α i } N i=1 ) satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2, and the social utility function
) satisfies Assumption 1, it suffices to prove that for 1 ≤ i ≤ N ,
By the definition of α i (A), we have that
Thus,
which shows that the utility system (γ,
) also satisfies Assumption 2.
Let A k = (a 1 , . . . , a k ) and A l = A k ⊕ (a k+1 , . . . , a l ) (l < N ). To prove that γ(A) = N i=1 α i (A) is submodular, it suffices to prove that for any a j ∈ M j (l + 1 ≤ j ≤ N ),
By definition, we have
We have now established that the utility system (γ,
) is valid, and the social utility function γ(A) = N i=1 α i (A) is submodular. This implies that the performance bound in Theorem 1 holds.
B. Social-Aware Nash Equilibria
We now prove that the utility system (γ, {η i } N i=1 ) satisfies Assumption 3. By the definition of γ(A), we have
Assuming the inequality
holds, we have η i (A) ≥ γ(A) − γ(A −i ), which implies that the utility system (γ,
It is easy to check that
This implies that the utility system (γ,
Finally, we have that
is submodular because we proved that 
is submodular. This implies that the performance bound for a social-aware Nash equilibrium in Theorem 3 holds.
C. Group Nash Equilibria
We now partition the set of users N = {1, . . . , N } into l disjoint groups and write, as before, 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered two types of grouping among users in utility systems. The first type of grouping is from Chen et al. [8] , where each user belongs to a group of users having social ties with it. For this type of utility system, each user takes its strategy by maximizing its social group utility function, giving rise to the notion of socialaware Nash equilibrium. We proved that, for a valid utility system, if the social utility function is submodular, then any social-aware Nash equilibrium achieves at least 1/2 of the optimal social utility, subject to a function-dependent additive term. We further proved that if the social utility function is nondecreasing and submodular, then any socialaware Nash equilibrium achieves at least 1/(1 + c) times the optimal social utility, where c is the curvature of the social utility function. For the second type of grouping we consider, the set of users is partitioned into l disjoint groups, where the users within a group takes their group strategy by maximizing their group utility, giving rise to the notion of the group Nash equilibrium. We proved that, for a valid utility system, if the social utility function is submodular, then any group Nash equilibrium achieves at least 1/2 of the optimal social utility, subject to a function-dependent additive term. By defining the curvature c ki associated with group i with k i users, we showed that if the social utility function is nondecreasing and submodular, then any group Nash equilibrium achieves at least 1/(1 + max 1≤i≤l c ki ) of the optimal social utility. Finally, we presented an example of a utility system for database assisted spectrum access to illustrate our results.
